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PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES: 
NEWFOUNDLAND AND NOVA SCOTIAʼ’S  




This paper provides an overview of some key issues which have arisen 
since the implementation of political resolutions to the contentious issue 
of offshore governance. Through an examination of: i) the role of the 
Petroleum Boards which manage offshore development; ii) the royalty 
and benefits regimes in place offshore Newfoundland and Nova Scotia; 
iii) the impact of the federal equalization scheme on provincial offshore 
revenues; and iv) some critical perspectives of the current offshore gov-
ernance arrangements, this paper provides a background for the larger 
question of whether, in fact, the provinces have achieved the status of 
“primary beneficiaries” as originally envisioned by the provincial and 
federal governments. While this question is not conclusively answered 
herein, the suggestion made is that, from the perspective of maximising 
benefits for the provinces, the management regimes currently in place 
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will review benefits and royalty regimes which govern the 
offshore oil and gas industries in the provinces of Nova Scotia and New-
foundland and Labrador.1  Rather than providing a detailed analysis of 
any single aspect of the regimes, it surveys the major issues in this area, 
and attempts to address a number of questions. The questions posed are 
as follows: Who regulates the offshore, and where does this authority 
to do so come from? What are the goals of the regulatory regime; are 
these goals being met, and if not, what are the impediments standing in 
the way? 
Part I provides a necessary background. This consists of a review 
of the political arrangement reached between the federal and provin-
cial governments to govern the management of offshore petroleum. In 
Part II, the structure of the royalty and benefits regimes governing the 
provincesʼ’ offshore industries are examined, along with the related is-
sue of federal equalization payments. Part III provides a brief look at 
the policies that Norway and the United Kingdom adopted during the 
development of the North Sea oil and gas industry in order to encour-
age the growth and viability of their own domestic supply and service 
industries. This material provides a point of comparison and contrast to 
the strategy adopted in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. Finally, Part 
IV addresses a number of critical perspectives on the Atlantic Canadian 
benefits and royalties regimes. While not drawing any firm conclusions, 
it is hoped that these perspectives will assist in an analysis of whether 
the provinces have gotten what they originally expected from the juris-
dictional arrangements governing their offshore industries. 
II. LEGAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE REGULATORY 
REGIMES
It would be ineffective to undertake an examination of the existing regu-
latory regimes governing the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore 
oil industries without having an understanding of the legal and political 
1 For convenience, the author refers to the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador as “New-
foundland” in the remainder of this essay.
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background underlying these regimes. The current regimes emerged as 
a solution to years of competing claims by the governments of the prov-
inces and the federal government over control of offshore oil and gas 
resources, both in the political and legal sphere. This tumultuous period 
eventually culminated in a political agreement in the form of the Atlan-
tic Accord2 and in legislation that was intended to give the agreement 
legal effect.  This section lays out the legal foundation upon which this 
compromise was built.
1. The Atlantic Accord: A Political Solution
It is not surprising that the agreement finally reached by Newfound-
land and the federal government was grounded in politics rather than in 
strict legal entitlements. Commentators have noted that, “[t]he politics 
of Newfoundland and its impact on oil and gas development has and, no 
doubt, will continue to be as crucial a determinant in the development 
of the offshore as will any legislative enactment.”3  The Hibernia Refer-
ence4 (in which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the continental 
shelf rights rested with the federal government) was a bitter disappoint-
ment to the Newfoundland Government, which continued to maintain 
a “moral entitlement” to control the offshore. This position was buoyed 
by a frustration over its lack of control of its fisheries, as well as a deter-
mination to overcome high levels of unemployment.5  The province had 
no choice but to seek a negotiated agreement with the federal govern-
ment. 
Following the decision in the Hibernia Reference, the Newfound-
land government, noting that the federal Progressive Conservative party 
(then in opposition) was enjoying an upswing in popularity, began ne-
gotiating with party representatives. The federal Tories had publicly tak-
2 The Atlantic Accord: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government Of Canada And 
The Government Of Newfoundland And Labrador On Offshore Oil And Gas Resource Manage-
ment and Revenue Sharing (11 February 1985) [Atlantic Accord].
3 C.P. MacDonald & R.S.G. Thompson, “The Atlantic Accord: The Politics of Compromise” 
(1985) 24 No. 1 Alta. L. Rev. 61 at 61-62 [Macdonald and Thompson].
4 Reference re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 
1 S.C.R. 86, 5 D.L.R. (4th) 384 [Hibernia Reference cited to S.C.R.].
5 Hunt, Constance D., The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia (Calgary: 
Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1989) at 5-6 [Hunt].
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en the position that the provinces should have significant control over 
offshore management, a policy position maintained during Joe Clarkʼ’s 
short tenure as Prime Minister in 1979. Clark had discussed a transfer 
of jurisdiction in 1979, but the PCs were defeated before this could hap-
pen. In the wake of the Hibernia Reference decision “Ownership” of 
the resource could no longer be claimed by the province, so the terms 
of the discussion were adapted. In 1984, newly elected Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney expressed his willingness to facilitate Newfoundland 
participation in the offshore. Earlier discussions between Mulroney and 
Newfoundland Premier Brian Peckford became the basis of the Atlantic 
Accord in the aftermath of the Tory election victory.6 The Atlantic Ac-
cord was a political agreement that provided a blueprint for a legisla-
tive framework for shared jurisdiction over the development of offshore 
resources. 
The Atlantic Accord agreement was signed by Premier Peckford 
and Prime Minister Mulroney on February 11, 1985. Following this, 
the federal and provincial governments began the process of drafting 
the reciprocal sets of legislation that would form the legal framework to 
govern the Newfoundland offshore area. Because the province had no 
jurisdiction to extend legislation to the offshore area (one of the findings 
in the Hibernia Reference), “mirror legislation” was required to create a 
sphere of shared jurisdiction for the federal and provincial governments. 
Federal legislation was required which would referentially extend pro-
vincial legislation to the offshore. On April 4, 1987, the Atlantic Ac-
cord agreement was finally implemented by Canada - Newfoundland 
Accord-Implementation Act7 and the Canada - Newfoundland Atlantic 
Accord Implementation Newfoundland Act8 both coming into force. 
In 1982, Nova Scotia reached an agreement with the federal govern-
ment to jointly share the management of offshore petroleum resources.9 
The agreement contained a “most - favoured province” clause. This 
6 Ibid. at 13. 
7 S.C. 1987, c. 3 [Newfoundland Accord Act].
8 Later renamed the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation 
Newfoundland and Labrador Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-2 [Newfoundland Accord Act (Newfound-
land), and collectively with the Newfoundland Accord Act, the Newfoundland Accord Acts].
9Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Management and Revenue 
Sharing (2 March 1982) [1982 Nova Scotia Agreement].
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clause provided that if the federal government entered into an offshore 
oil and gas management agreement with any other province prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1985 (i.e. Newfoundland), the Nova Scotia government could 
substitute the latter agreement in its entirety for the entirety of its exist-
ing agreement. 
Nova Scotia invoked the clause, and on August 26, 1986 the Prime 
Minister and Premier of Nova Scotia signed the Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord.10 The Nova Scotia Accord ul-
timately led to the passing of the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Pe-
troleum Resources Accord Implementation Act11 and the Canada-Nova 
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova 
Scotia) Act12, which served to extend joint jurisdiction to the Nova Sco-
tia offshore area, just as the Newfoundland Accord Acts had done for 
the Newfoundland offshore. 
The following section discusses the purposes of the Accord agree-
ments as they were set out at the time of their creation, and the structure 
of the joint-management regimes that these deals created. It also exam-
ines the benefits and royalty regimes that the agreements provided for, 
and describes the impacts of the federal equalization formula on the 
provincesʼ’ abilities to benefit from the revenues thereby generated.
10 Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord (26 August 1986) [Nova Scotia 
Accord].
11 S.C. 1988, c. 28 [Nova Scotia Accord Act].
12 S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 [together with the Nova Scotia Accord Act, hereinafter Nova Scotia Accord 
Acts]. The Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 8 and the Nova Scotia Accord Acts are referred 
to as the Accord Acts. 
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATORY REGIMES UNDER THE 
ACCORD ACTS
1. The Stated Purposes of the Atlantic Accord and Nova Scotia 
Accord 
As noted in the section above, the political settlements reached through 
the Atlantic Accord and Nova Scotia Accord were implemented into law 
through “mutual and parallel legislation.”13  One requirement of this 
legislation was the assurance that certain powers that would otherwise 
be exercised by the federal and provincial ministers in respect of the ma-
rine and shelf areas beyond the low water mark off the provinces, would 
be exercisable by the joint petroleum boards (discussed below). Another 
was to complete the framework of rules for shared decision-making as 
envisioned by the two Accord agreements.14  In short, the extension of 
provincial laws and decision-making powers into the offshore areas was 
accomplished through a combination of administrative inter-delegation 
and legislative referential incorporation.15
Section 2 of the Atlantic Accord16 and section 1.02 of the Nova Sco-
tia Accord17 set out the similar objectives that those agreements sought 
to facilitate. For the most part, the provisions of these sections are iden-
tically worded. There are several themes in the agreements that are cen-
tral to the current discussion. These include: 
1) The idea that the development of offshore oil and gas reserves 
should occur for the benefit of Canada in general and of the 
provinces in particular (see section 2(a) of the Atlantic Accord 
and section 1.02(a) of the Nova Scotia Accord);
2) The recognition that the provinces have the right to be the 
principal beneficiaries of the oil and gas resources off their 
shores (section 2(c) of the Atlantic Accord and section 1.02(c) 
of the Nova Scotia Accord);
13 Supra note 2 at s. 1. 
14 Supra note 3 at 63.
15 See Alan Pettie, “Are Royalty Agreements Required for Canada East Coast Offshore Oil and 
Gas?” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J.151 at 180-181 [Pettie].
16 Supra note 2.
17 Supra note 10.
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3) The recognition of the equality of the Federal and Provincial 
Governments in the management of the resources, as well as 
the need to ensure that development is optimized to provide 
economic and social benefits to the country generally and the 
provinces specifically (section 2(d) of the Atlantic Accord and 
section 1.02(d) of the Nova Scotia Accord), and;
4) The provision that the provinces can establish and collect 
resource revenues as if the resources were on land within the 
provinces (section 2(e) of the Atlantic Accord and section 
1.02(e) of the Nova Scotia Accord). 
In reviewing these themes, it is important to not only recognize the ac-
ceptance by the Federal Government of shared jurisdiction over offshore 
resources, but also the strength of the commitments that the revenues 
and benefits arising from the development of these resources would pri-
marily benefit the provinces. A critical examination of the benefit and 
royalty regimes governing the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore 
industries requires a focus on these key principles. The question asked 
herein is, “are the current regimes meeting the general objectives set out 
in the Accord agreements?”
2. Shared Jurisdiction - The Boards and Industrial Benefits
The implementation of the Accord Acts18 established the Canada-New-
foundland Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NOPB) and the Canada-Nova 
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NSOPB). These boards have the 
delegated authority to administer most aspects of the management and 
regulatory regimes within their respective offshore areas.  A. Taylor and 
J. Dickey have commented that the establishment of the boards under 
the Accord Acts is central to the administration of the offshore regimes 
in two respects. First, much of the decision-making process was shifted 
from the bureaucracies at the two levels of government in each region 
to an entity separate from government. Second, the level of discretion-
ary power held by the administrator (previously the Minister under the 
18Supra note 12.
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Canada Oil and Gas Act19) was diminished and instead provided better-
defined criteria and processes by which decisions are to be made.20
The mandates of the boards are derived from the Accord Acts, and 
include the issuance of and administration over petroleum exploration 
and development rights in their respective offshore areas; the adminis-
tration of statutory requirements regulating offshore exploration, devel-
opment and production; and the approval of Canada-Newfoundland and 
Canada-Nova Scotia benefits and development plans.21 For the purposes 
of the present discussion, we are most concerned with these “benefits 
plans.” 
The Nova Scotia Accord Acts22 and the Newfoundland Accord Acts23 
all contain provisions (section 45 in each case) describing the contents 
of the benefits plan that is required of every proponent who applies to 
the boards for approval of a development project. The wording of these 
provisions is nearly identical. For illustrative purposes, section 45(1) 
from the Newfoundland Accord Act (Newfoundland)24 is reproduced be-
low:
45. (1) In this section “Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 
benefits plan” means a plan for the employment of Canadians and, 
in particular, members of the labour force of the province and... 
for providing manufacturers, consultants, contractors and service 
companies in the province and other parts of Canada with a fair 
opportunity to participate on a competitive basis in the supply of 
goods and services used in a proposed work or activity referred to 
in the benefits plan.
Taylor and Dickey have noted the difficulties that the relatively intangi-
ble elements of “full and fair opportunity to participate” and “first con-
sideration” have caused the boards in their attempts to construe these 
requirements.25  The first offshore oil project in Canada was the Cohas-
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. O-6 as rep. by the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.36 (2nd 
Supp.), s.130.
20 A. Taylor et al., “Regulatory Regime: Canada-Newfoundland/Nova Scotia Offshore Petro-
leum Board Issues” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 51 at 56-57. 
21 Ibid. at 59.
22 Supra note 12.
23 Supra note 8.
24 Supra note 8.
25 Supra note 20 at 77-80. 
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set project in offshore Nova Scotia. The project operator (LASMO Nova 
Scotia, later PanCanadian) filed its benefits plan in December 1989, 
about a month before the C-NSOPB was established. One of the boardʼ’s 
first tasks was to decide how to assess how a “full and fair opportunity” 
was to be afforded. The view taken by the C-NSOPB at that time, which 
it continues to hold, is that a “full and fair opportunity” is demonstrated 
through the requirement that an operator abide by a procurement policy 
that is “open, fair and predictable.”26  
Taylor and Dickey argue that many of the complaints made by ob-
servers who claim that local interests are not receiving a fair share of the 
work generated by offshore projects arise because of a lack of under-
standing of the inherent “competitiveness” element of the “full and fair 
opportunity” requirement. They write that:
[U]nlike the C-NSOPB, these commentators have no knowledge of 
how bids on any particular contract stack up in terms of commercial, 
technical, or quality competitiveness. Indications are, however, that 
local companies are becoming increasingly competitive as they gain 
more experience and local infrastructure grows.27
The second important element in defining the benefits plan is “first con-
sideration.” Subsection 45 (3) of the Accord Acts requires that a benefits 
plan commits to providing “first consideration” to “individuals resident 
in the province” for training and employment, and also states that “first 
consideration is to be given to services provided from within the Prov-
ince and to goods manufactured in the Province, where those services 
and goods are competitive in terms of fair market price, quality and 
delivery.”28
Again we see that a competitiveness criterion is involved in the defi-
nition of “first consideration.” As Taylor and Dickey explain by con-
tinued reference to the Nova Scotia context, the C-NSOPBʼ’s interpreta-
tion of this principle envisions it being applied at two stages during an 
operatorʼ’s procurement process. The first is during the establishment of 
the bidderʼ’s list and the second is at the contract award stage. If there 
are a sufficient number of qualified local bidders, then the list should 
26 Supra note 20 at 77.
27 Supra note 20 at 78.
28 Accord Acts, supra note 12, s. 45(3)(b).
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be confined to these local bidders. It is argued that the objective of the 
Accord agreements, that the respective provinces should be the prin-
ciple beneficiaries of offshore development, is operationalized in this 
manner.29  The second stage of application of the “first consideration” 
criterion occurs when an operator is presented with a situation in which 
there are competing bids submitted which contain varying degrees of 
local content, but are otherwise essentially equal in terms of price and 
quality. In such a situation, the operator is expected by the board to 
award the contract to the bidder with the greater degree of local content. 
However, the authors note the limits on the boardsʼ’ abilities to reward 
bids that maximize local content. They observe, “it also must be ac-
knowledged that usually bids are not equal. If pressed, an operator can 
usually identify some ʻ‘materialʼ’ difference, be it technical, commercial 
or otherwise.”30
Like any administrative decision maker, the boards can only op-
erate within their statutorily authorized domains. Their jurisdiction to 
oversee and enforce specific measures with regard to industrial benefits 
plans is limited to what is explicitly provided for in the enabling legis-
lation. As becomes apparent in a review of the legislation (as above), 
the indeterminate language used does not easily provide for firm and 
comprehensive levels of local participation in offshore development. 
The limitations inherent in these provisions regarding their ability to 
actively boost local participation are discussed in greater detail later in 
this paper. 
3. Royalties
The issues surrounding the generation of royalties and taxes by gov-
ernment from offshore petroleum development are extremely numerous 
and complex.  Due to the limited scope of this paper, the discussion 
is limited to an examination of the legal source of the provincial gov-
ernmentsʼ’ abilities to levy royalties and taxes against operators in the 
offshore industry and a brief description of the mechanisms employed 
to do this. Also, the issue of provincial equalization payments must be 
29 Supra note 20 at 79.
30 Supra note 20 at 79.
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discussed in this context, as it is a key limiting factor in any improve-
ments that are to be hoped for in the provincesʼ’ financial affairs. 
Despite the provincesʼ’ legislative competence to levy royalties and 
certain forms of taxation against the oil companies exploring for and 
producing petroleum in their offshore areas, there are a number of fac-
tors that are at play in the structures of and limits upon these sources of 
revenue. One important factor is that the petroleum production industry 
is global. For this reason, the governments must monitor the various fis-
cal regimes in petroleum producing regions around the world to ensure 
that local exploration and production remains viable and attractive to 
petroleum companies.31 Royalty regimes will either encourage or dis-
courage development depending on the degree to which they impact 
profitability. The Nova Scotia and Newfoundland governments must 
also consider the fiscal instruments they employ based on their larger 
strategies to extract social and economic benefits from these develop-
ments. It is in this context that the desired industrial benefits discussed 
above have to be factored into overall development strategies.32 
The source of the provincial authority to levy royalties against off-
shore producers arises pursuant to the provincial acts that the Accord 
Acts referentially incorporate, and the regulations that are established 
thereunder. In Nova Scotia, these are the Offshore Petroleum Royalty 
Act33 and the Offshore Petroleum Royalty Regulations.34 In Newfound-
land, these are the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act35 and the Royalty 
Regulations.36 
Both provinces originally negotiated individual royalty agreements 
with offshore producers, such as the operators of the Cohasset and Sa-
ble developments off Nova Scotia and the operators of the Hibernia 
and Terra Nova projects off Newfoundland. Such agreements were ex-
tremely complex and time consuming to reach. For example, the Hi-
bernia royalty agreement took more than a year to negotiate, while the 
31 Watkins, G.C., “Atlantic Petroleum Royalties: Fair Deal or Raw Deal” (2001) Atlantic Insti-
tute for Market Studies (Paper #2 in AIMS Oil and Gas Series).
32 M. Harrington et al., “Emerging Issues In East Coast Oil and Gas Development” (1997) 35 
No. 2 Alta. L. Rev. 269 at 293. 
33 S.N.S. 1987, c. 9.
34 N.S. Reg. 71/99.
35 R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-10.
36 Nfld. Reg. 84/01.
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Sable agreement took a year and a half.37 The indeterminacy, complex-
ity and cost associated with the need to negotiate royalty agreements on 
a project-to-project basis is a disincentive to offshore development, and 
has led both provincial governments to develop generic royalty regimes 
for their offshore areas in order to establish a predictable mechanism for 
determining royalty levies. 
4. Equalization
The federal equalization program operates pursuant to the Federal-Pro-
vincial Fiscal Arrangements Act.38 This program makes payments to 
the provinces whose ability to raise revenues (their “fiscal capacity”) 
is below that of a baseline level. The formula that determines this level 
measures the fiscal capacity of the ten Canadian provinces on the basis 
of thirty-three individual revenue sources. It then determines the differ-
ence between these individual fiscal capacities and an average capacity 
based on the average of the five provinces remaining after excluding 
Alberta and the four Atlantic provinces. The federal government com-
pares the individual provincial capacities against this average measure, 
and the provinces below the average receive a per-capita payment based 
on the differential.39 
As noted above, petroleum royalties and related provincial taxes 
bring increased revenue to the treasuries of Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia. As revenues rise, both provinces receive lower equalization 
transfer payments because the provincesʼ’ fiscal capacity is closer to the 
baseline determined by the formula described above. Because a con-
comitant decrease in equalization payments accompanying increased 
provincial revenues was anticipated by the parties during the negotia-
tion of the Atlantic Accord and Nova Scotia Accord, the agreements 
established “equalization offset provisions” so that the provinces would 
not experience dollar for dollar decreases in transfer payments as pro-
vincial revenues rose.
37 Pettie, supra note 15 at 195.
38 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8.
39 Boessenkool, K.J., “Taking Off the Shackles: Equalization and the Development of Non-
renewable Resources in Atlantic Canada” (2001) Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (Paper #1 
in AIMS Oil and Gas Series) [Boessenkool].
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As the initial formulas provided a low level of protection, the federal 
government responded to calls from several provinces for changes to 
the preferential treatment the Atlantic offshore revenues were receiving. 
In 1993, the federal government introduced a generic offset provision.40 
Under this provision, if an equalization-receiving province has seventy 
percent or more of a tax base, then the taxback rate (the amount that the 
revenue source will diminish potential equalization payments) on that 
revenue source is capped at seventy percent. Under this formula, the 
equalization payment flowing to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland can be 
reduced by no more than seventy percent of the amount of their offshore 
oil and gas revenues.  
Thus far, this paper has traced the legal and political basis for the 
regulatory regimes governing the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia off-
shore oil and gas industries. It has also provided an overview of the 
benefits and royalty schemes in place, and the impact of equalization 
on provincial revenue. For comparative purposes, the following section 
sets out a brief description of strategies in Norway and the U.K. for the 
regulation of the offshore petroleum industries, with a particular focus 
on the efforts of each jurisdiction to maximize the local benefits of off-
shore development.
IV: COMPARISONS WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS: NORWAY AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Norway and the United Kingdom often provide a basis of comparison 
in critical discussions about the choices and directions taken by those 
politicians and regulators who are plotting the course for the Atlantic 
Canadian offshore industries. In a number of ways, Norway and the 
U.K. are relevant comparators. Like Norway and the U.K., (and unlike 
many of the worldʼ’s developing nations in which oil production is cur-
rently taking place) Atlantic Canada has a stable political and labour 
environment, which makes it attractive to oil companies seeking new 
40 Ibid. at 29.
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exploration and production opportunities.41 In other areas, there are sig-
nificant differences. 
One important distinction between the Newfoundland and Nova Sco-
tia industries and those offshore of Norway and the U.K. is that devel-
opers in the North Sea have only one level of government to deal with; 
Norway and the U.K are both unitary states, meaning that their national 
governments have full authority over the offshore industry. Canada has 
developed a legal and regulatory framework to share jurisdiction over 
the offshore between the federal and provincial governments, which 
adds complexity to operating within Atlantic Canada (despite the intent 
that the Petroleum Boards would provide a single regulatory authority 
for most purposes).42 Also, the fact that the size of the proven reserves 
of the North Sea are well beyond those which have so far been proven 
offshore Newfoundland and Nova Scotia also skews efforts to draw di-
rect comparisons between these regions. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of a general examination of the dif-
ferent strategies that can be utilized to maximize benefits from offshore 
development, Norway and the U.K. are useful points of comparison. 
Economist Wade Locke has argued that the Atlantic Canadian industry 
can benefit from the examples of Norway and the U.K. in its efforts to 
develop a regulatory environment which balances a “commercial re-
quirement for operators to remain cost competitive with the regional 
economic development requirement that “full and fair opportunity” be 
given to Atlantic Canadian individuals and companies.”43
1. Norway
The most distinctive aspect of Norwayʼ’s offshore policies is the level 
of direct state involvement in the industry. Since the early 1970s, the 
41 McMullan, Sandy: Presentation to Oceans Law and Policy class, Dalhousie Law School, 
March 12, 2003. Mr. McMullan also noted that Norway and the U.K are among the regions that 
the Nova Scotia government considers as its main competitors when evaluating strategies to 
attract oil companies to the region. 
42 Pettie (supra note 15) has expressed concern that despite the legislative detail and complexity 
of the mirror legislation that has implemented the Accord agreements, there are serious constitu-
tional problems with the scheme, and that certain of its provisions may actually be invalid. 
43 Locke, Wade, “Harnessing the Potential: Atlantic Canadaʼ’s Oil and Gas Industry: An Analysis 
of the Variables Affecting Present and Future Involvement of Local Business” (1986) Back-
ground report for the Royal Commission of Employment and Unemployment, at 28 [Locke].
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Norwegian state has undertaken a central role in ensuring Norwegian 
involvement in its offshore, and generally directed development of 
the industry by establishing a state oil company, called “Statoil.” This 
strategy was developed on the premise that Norwegian society would 
receive the most benefit from its offshore oil industry if the industry 
could be subjected to political control.44 Through the use of this “insider 
approach,” Statoil has provided a vehicle through which the state has 
exercised an option for up to fifty percent participation in oilfield de-
velopments.45 While licences have been awarded in part on the basis of 
competitive bidding, preferential treatment has been provided to Statoil 
and other domestic companies during licensing rounds. In some cases, 
certain parcels of land were held for these companies only, and in other 
cases Statoil was specified as the operator on the licences from the out-
set.46 
The Norwegian stateʼ’s direct involvement in individual oil develop-
ments has given it a great deal of influence over the decisions of multi-
nationals regarding their procurement of goods and services. A second 
part of the Norwegian strategy has been to require that foreign devel-
opers use Norwegian supply companies, subject to quality, pricing and 
delivery considerations. These licensees are monitored pursuant to leg-
islated powers which link the granting of future licences to their past 
records of using Norwegian suppliers. In this way Statoil has broken 
down the traditional purchasing practices of the large multinational oil 
companies and provided access to domestic firms in the areas of design, 
engineering, and project management. Known as “Norwegian Technol-
ogy Agreements,” these are usually entered into at the licensing stage 
and are used as a basis for transferring technology from the multination-
als to the countryʼ’s domestic offshore players.47 Norway has also used 
licensing to encourage foreign companies to assist in the development 
of its general domestic industries.48
44 Nelsen, B.F., The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British 
and Norwegian Continental Shelves (New York: Praeger, 1991) at 35-37 [Nelsen].
45 Ryan, Carey P., “Offshore Petroleum: Industrial Benefits and Fiscal Policies (Literature Re-
view)” prepared for the Atlantic Canada Petroleum Institute, 2001 at 3 [Ryan].
46 Locke, supra note 43 at 28.
47 Ryan, supra note 45 at 3-4.
48 Locke, supra note 43 at 28.
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Statoilʼ’s role in Norwegian oil and gas policy has been changing 
dramatically over the past ten to fifteen years. At present, the company 
operates under the same commercial terms as the other participants in 
the Norwegian offshore, and is no longer a tool of the stateʼ’s petroleum 
policy. In 2000, the Norwegian state began the process of privatizing 
Statoil by listing between ten and twenty-five percent of the companyʼ’s 
value on the stock market, while still retaining more than two-thirds of 
the company.49 This move could be viewed as an indication of the fact 
that Norway now has a mature and stable petroleum industry, with a ro-
bust domestic component no longer dependent on the type of firm state 
intervention described above. 
Norwayʼ’s regulatory regime has largely been attributed with the no-
table successes enjoyed by its domestic industries. The policies put in 
place during the 1970s are largely responsible for the fact that the share 
of goods and services supplied to the offshore industry by domestic 
firms has risen to over sixty percent.50  The result has been that Norway 
has developed leading expertise in offshore oil and gas production, and 
is now an exporter of such expertise to many parts of the world, includ-
ing Atlantic Canada.51 While Norway may no longer require the strong 
interventionist policies that it employed during the early stages of its 
offshore development, the importance of these policies in developing 
its domestic industry (and the social and economic benefits that it has 
brought) is undeniable. 
2. The United Kingdom
At about the same time Norway was dealing with the offshore problem, 
the U.K. was also confronted by the question of how to ensure that the 
benefits of offshore petroleum flowed toward British workers and firms. 
Unlike Norwayʼ’s “protectionist” approach, the U.K developed a strat-
egy that has been referred to as a “free market approach.”52 U.K. firms 
49 Ryan, supra note 45 at 4.
50 Nelsen, supra note 44 at 98.
51 Locke, supra note 43 at 29.
52 IDP Consultants Ltd., “Newfoundlandʼ’s Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: An Analysis of the 
Variables Affecting Present and Future Involvement of Local Business” (1986), Background 
report for the Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment at 15.
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initially had difficulty penetrating the offshore industry partially due to 
the high costs associated with entering the industry and the strong exist-
ing bonds that the large multinational oil companies (mostly American) 
had with their traditional suppliers (again, mostly American).53  
Following the receipt in 1973 of a report by the International Man-
agement and Engineering Group (IMEG), the British Government de-
cided to take an active role in the development of a competitive offshore 
goods and supply industry. One aspect of this policy involved the crea-
tion of an Offshore Supplies Office (OSO), which had as its mandate the 
tasks of auditing oil company purchasing reports (in the effort to pres-
sure oil companies to “buy British”) and also providing financial assist-
ance to the local supply industry. Auditing was essentially designed to 
shame companies into providing a “full and fair opportunity” for local 
suppliers to compete for contracts.54 
In 1975, the British Department of Energy signed a “Memorandum 
of Understanding” with the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Asso-
ciation (UKOOA) that further opened the purchasing process to govern-
ment scrutiny. In particular, it gave the OSO auditors the ability to review 
the lists of companies invited by an operator to bid on projects, and after 
the bids were in, to review them. This was designed to ensure that local 
bidders received the “full and fair opportunity” promised. The auditors 
were not allowed to strike bidding companies off these lists, but they 
could add the names of local companies. Technically, the only power 
the OSO had was moral persuasion, but it was backed by the implicit 
threat that an uncooperative purchaser would be treated unfavourably in 
the next round of licensing, as offshore parcels were put up for bids.55 
Despite some descriptions of the British governmentʼ’s strategy as “free 
market,” it certainly contained some indirectly coercive elements. 
Like Norway, the U.K.ʼ’s perceived need to actively protect and as-
sist its local participants in the offshore industry seems to be waning. 
Having achieved a successful and mature service industry, the British 
government seems to have turned its focus to concerns that reflect a 
53 Ryan, supra note 45 at 4.
54 Nelsen, supra note 72 at 74-75.
55 Nelsen, supra note 44 at 75. At 100-1, Nelsen describes an incident in which Sun Oil, an 
American company, awarded a large contract for the construction of a floating platform to a 
Swedish company over a British company that had hoped and expected to get the contract. In 
succeeding rounds of bidding for acreage, Sun Oilʼ’s applications were rejected; the implication 
being that Sun was being punished for awarding the earlier contract to the foreign shipyard.
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mature industry in its later stages of development. The government now 
appears to be undertaking a facilitative role rather than an intervention-
ist one (as was manifest in the earlier activities of the OSO). In a policy 
with characteristics similar to Norwayʼ’s focus on the future, the British 
government in 1998 established the “Oil and Gas Industry Task Force.” 
This task force has an ambitious agenda focussing on specific areas im-
pacting the industry, and addresses skills and training, innovation and 
technology. 
Despite the fact that the U.K.ʼ’s policies toward the regulation of 
its offshore industries have been largely characterized as “free market” 
policies, while those of Norway have been seen as “interventionist,” 
this brief overview provided above demonstrates that in both cases the 
respective governments took significant steps to foster their domestic 
service and supply industries. This was done in recognition of the desire 
that the benefits coming from the exploitation of this resource should be 
maximized for the advantage of the respective nationsʼ’ service indus-
tries and labour force. The jobs and economic spin-offs that arise from 
the exploitation of offshore petroleum are some of the most valuable el-
ements of this kind of industrial development. The success of the British 
and Norwegians in offshore, service and supply industries can be traced 
to the support that these sectors received from their governments during 
the formative stages of North Sea offshore development. The precedent 
set by Norway and the U.K. is important to consider when evaluating 
the policies in place to support local industries in the context of Nova 
Scotia and Newfoundland. Without the protection and intervention by 
the respective state governments in Norway and the U.K., it seems evi-
dent that those countries would not have developed their strong domes-
tic supply and support industries. 
V: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Among the stated goals of the Accord agreements were the objectives 
that the provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland would be the pri-
mary beneficiaries of offshore oil and gas development, and that the 
provincial governments would be able to control these resources as if 
they were located on land. The tangible benefits that would flow to the 
provinces were to take the form of revenue from royalties and taxation, 
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and industrial benefits such as employment and local economic stimula-
tion. From our examination of the jurisdictional and management re-
gimes governing these resources, it becomes clear that the ability of 
the provinces (with federal involvement) to achieve such objectives is 
very much tied to the limitations inherent in the statutory and policy 
instruments which structure offshore governance. While the determina-
tion and creativity of provincial politicians, regulators and stakeholders 
are important factors to consider, the impediments that these actors face 
arise for the most part from the legal and statutory underpinnings of the 
regulatory environment. In the remainder of this section, some critical 
perspectives on these impediments are explored. 
1. Royalties and Equalization
In hindsight, it appears somewhat implausible that Newfoundland was 
ever worried that the development of offshore oil would “overheat the 
economy,”56 causing economic and social turmoil in the process. Yet, 
expectations were high in the early years of the oil frenzy and such 
problems had been witnessed during earlier development in Norway. 
One explanation for why the provinces did not press harder to protect 
royalty revenue from the “clawback” mechanism of the federal equali-
zation program may be tied to the expectation that once production be-
gan, oil revenue would be so great that equalization would quickly cease 
to be a concern. However, there are also indications that the provincesʼ’ 
weak bargaining positions in the wake of the Hibernia Reference deci-
sion also played a part; the perception seems to have existed that by 
trading off direct cash revenues, significant industrial benefits might be 
gained.  Jim Thistle, a St. Johnʼ’s lawyer, was advising the Newfound-
land government in the period of litigation with the federal government 
leading up to the signing of the Atlantic Accord. He has described the 
provinceʼ’s strategy as follows:
We had a scheme that emphasized jobs, technology transfer, location 
of operations. All the stuff that offshore development brings, rather 
than royalties. This approach is sometimes questioned - why the 
emphasis? Well, money is great if you keep it. But two reasons really 
drove our approach: 1) Royalty monetary gains were offset greatly 
56 See, for example, IDP report supra note 52 at 13.
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by equalization  losses; and 2) If we lost the court case (which was 
what we anticipated) the companies couldnʼ’t just pick up all their 
investment in people and infrastructure and move.57 
Nevertheless, the issue of royalties from offshore oil and gas has re-
mained prominent. After all, it is asked, if Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia really are supposed to be the primary beneficiaries of the offshore 
(as the Accord agreements promised), why is the bulk of the revenue 
(seventy percent under the “generic equalization formula” described 
above) from royalties flowing toward Ottawa? The simple answer is laid 
out in the discussion above, and is tied to the constitutional structure of 
Canada and the structure of the federal equalization program. But, such 
legal formalism does not provide a satisfactory answer for many, and 
numerous critiques have been made of the impacts of the equalization 
program on offshore royalties. 
One such critique has been advanced by economist Kenneth Boes-
senkool. Writing for the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, Boes-
senkool presents a two-pronged economics argument against including 
resource revenues in the equalization formula.58 The first part of his argu-
ment is that royalties from non-renewable resources are a capital asset, 
in that they are a transfer of a stock of wealth from one form to another, 
without any actual increase in total wealth in the process. The same is 
not true of renewable resources. From an accounting point of view, he 
argues, the sale of an existing asset is not the creation of revenue, but 
merely a change in the form of existing capital. Therefore, royalties 
should not be considered a revenue stream for the purposes of calculat-
ing equalization transfers.59 The second part of Boessenkoolʼ’s argument 
is that royalties, or “rents from the extraction of natural resources”60 
are in effect capitalized throughout the wider economy as a provinceʼ’s 
economy grows as a result of offshore development. Revenue sources 
such as sales tax, income tax and so forth are already included in the 
equalization formula, and as a result, direct natural resource revenues do 
not need to be; rather, he states, it “amounts to double counting.”61 
57 James L. Thistle, “The Hibernia Project: Lessons Learned - A Personal Perspective” (OTANS 
conference Halifax, NS, October 2000) [unpublished].
58 Boessenkool, supra note 39 at 8-10.
59 Boessenkool, supra note 39 at 8.
60 Boessenkool, supra note 39 at 9.
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Boessenkoolʼ’s arguments are not based on any notion of what is 
“right or wrong.” Rather, they are grounded in the morally detached 
“efficiency” paradigm that we have learned to expect from economists; 
he believes that the provinces will be induced to tax resource rents in 
an “inefficient” manner under the current equalization structure.62 How-
ever, other criticisms of the way in which equalization operates with 
regard to royalty revenues have focussed very clearly on the moral pro-
priety of the federal “clawback” of these revenues. 
One clear example of this is Nova Scotiaʼ’s lobbying effort known 
as the “Campaign for Fairness.” Led by Premier John Hamm, this cam-
paign is an effort to focus public attention on two related realities. First, 
the federal government committed, through the Nova Scotia Accord, 
that the province was to be the principal beneficiary of offshore devel-
opment. Second, the federal government is receiving about eighty-one 
cents of each dollar generated by offshore revenues for that province 
through the equalization mechanism.63 The crux of the argument made 
by Premier Hammʼ’s government is that the federal government has re-
neged on a solemn promise made to the province, and therefore the 
equalization mechanism should not be applied to offshore resource rev-
enues. 
This position has been supported by the well-known Newfound-
lander and former politician John Crosbie. Crosbie is quite familiar 
with the subject, as he was Minister of Justice and Attorney General in 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroneyʼ’s cabinet when the Atlantic Accord was 
signed with Newfoundland, and remained in that position until just a 
few weeks before the Nova Scotia Accord was signed in 1986. Crosbie, 
through a spate of newspaper editorials,64 has impugned the integrity 
61 Boessenkool, supra note 39 at 10.
62 Watkins, for his part, has also demonstrated a politically detached view of the royalty issue in 
his paper for AIMS (supra note 31). While making a reasonably convincing case that Nova Sco-
tia and Newfoundlandʼ’s royalty regimes are fair to both the provinces and the oil companies, he 
also argued that royalties should not be viewed as a tool to achieve socio-economic objectives. 
Rather, royalty levels should be set at levels that maximize efficiency (that is, where they would 
maximize benefits to the province without discouraging development). However, it seems an 
argument that posits that revenue policies should be made in isolation from social and economic 
objectives does not recognize the policy imperatives confronting governments in this context. 
63 The provinceʼ’s figures are available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/fairness/Fairness99.pdf.
64 See John Crosbie, Editorial, The Globe and Mail (12 September 2001). See also National Post 
June 13, 2001 and St. Johnʼ’s Telegram, October 21, 2001.
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of the federal government for its failure to live up to the clear commit-
ment made to the provinces regarding the right to receive the economic 
revenue from offshore development. As he wrote in the Globe and Mail 
on September 12, 2001:
The intent of these agreements was and is that Nova Scotia, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador, should and would receive the revenues 
from their respective offshore resources until their economies were 
at least at the national average level. In fact, in most documents they 
will remain principal beneficiaries until they reached 110-140% of 
national standards, depending on certain circumstances. 
In his editorials, Crosbie goes on to reference written and oral com-
mitments made by past (Tory and Liberal) federal governments to the 
provinces that reinforce this position. 
Through Crosbieʼ’s support of these moral arguments, Nova Scotiaʼ’s 
campaign has certainly received a boost, for who better than a person 
who was centrally involved to attest to the meaning of the commitments 
made to the provinces through the Accord agreements? At the same 
time, the question remains for Crosbie that if, as he claims, the intent 
was that royalty revenue would not be clawed back by Ottawa, why 
were stronger protections not put in place to protect this revenue from 
the equalization mechanism during his tenure? The quote from Thistle 
(see text accompanying note 57), while speaking from a period of time 
prior to the establishment of the equalization offset provisions in the 
Accord agreements, seems to indicate that the province (in this case 
Newfoundland) was anticipating from the outset that royalty income 
would be largely diminished by the equalization program.
It will be interesting to see if efforts by the provinces to renegotiate 
the way royalty revenues are treated by the equalization program are 
successful. It appears that in the meanwhile, the solution to the economic 
problems of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland will have to be sought else-
where. What remains is the economic activity and employment spurred 
by petroleum development. The benefits plans that were designed to 
support local involvement in these areas are addressed next.  
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2. Benefits Plans and their Implementation 
The approaches taken by Norway and U.K. in assisting their domestic 
offshore supply and support industries were reviewed above. The two 
approaches were quite different, but shared the fact that both included 
active protection and promotion of their local industries. In both Norway 
and the U.K., the respective policies have been largely responsible for 
the development of strong support industries that now export expertise 
globally. In Part II of this paper, the respective sections of the Accord 
Acts that provide that offshore operators provide “benefits plans” was 
discussed, as were the approaches that the petroleum boards have taken 
in interpreting this provision. When one looks closely at this provision 
one finds that its objectives are relatively clearly stated; local workers 
and companies will be given “full and fair opportunity” to compete for 
contracts and employment, and when other factors are equal, they will 
be given “first consideration” for those jobs and contracts. However, 
what is lacking is a meaningful mechanism to implement these objec-
tives. 
In their description of the C-NSOPBʼ’s approach to local benefits dur-
ing the Cohasset project and that of the C-NOPBʼ’s during the Hibernia 
project, Harrington et al. note that while the boards monitor the con-
tent of employment and supply contracts, their approach appears “to be 
mostly based upon a commitment by the proponent to principles rather 
than specific requirements.”65 More precisely, the boards monitor the oil 
companies to assess the levels of local content involved in their various 
projects, but do not specifically require that any level of local content is 
maintained. 
The “full and fair opportunity” phrase used in the openings of the 
Accord Acts is identical to that which was used under the “moral sua-
sion” approach utilized by the OSO in the U.K. This might indicate that 
the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland approach was intended to work the 
same way as the one employed by the OSO. However, as the Sun Oil 
anecdote noted above seems to indicate, there were real and substantial 
consequences for companies operating in the U.K. that did not abide 
by their “gentlemenʼ’s agreements” to “buy British.”66 There has been 
65 Supra note 32 at 299.
66 Nelsen, supra note 44 at 99-100.
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little indication from the Atlantic Canadian boards that unsatisfactory 
performances by oil companies in maintaining adequate levels of local 
content in their projects will elicit penalties or sanctions. In fact, recent 
developments in Newfoundland indicate that the C-NOPB is unwilling to 
even define its level of expectation regarding local content.   
On November 26, 2001, the C-NOPB released its final report on the 
White Rose Development Plan application and the corresponding Ben-
efits Plan application.67 The report granted approval to Husky Oil (with 
some conditions) for both plans. What is more noteworthy in the con-
text of the current discussion is the opportunity the board took in its 
report to respond to recommendations that had been previously made 
by White Rose Public Review Commissioner Herbert Clarke in his own 
report. Clarke is not an individual who is new to industrial develop-
ment in Newfoundland; he was deputy minister of development in Brian 
Peckfordʼ’s administration in the early 1980s as the province challenged 
the federal government for control of offshore oil.68 Clarkeʼ’s report rec-
ommended that the board establish “targets”, “quantifiable objectives”, 
“specific goals” or “specific benefits targets”, but noted “targets are not 
quotas... but rather management tools.”69
The C-NOPB unconditionally rejected this suggestion. In supporting 
this rejection, it progressed through several steps to demonstrate the 
rationale for its conclusion. First, it refused to accept the distinction be-
tween “targets” or “quantifiable objectives” and quotas, and argued that 
there is no authority granted in the legislation for the board to impose 
targets or quotas.70 As a principle of administrative law, it also observed 
that its authority to act is strictly circumscribed by the powers granted 
in s. 17(1) of the Accord Acts.71 Further, it drew particular attention to 
the presence of the phrase “on a competitive basis” in the wording of 
subsection 45(1) of the Accord Acts:
67 C-NOPB, White Rose Project Development Plan Decision Report, Canada-Newfoundland 
Benefits Plan Decision Report (26 November, 2001).
68 See J.D. Houseʼ’s The Challenge of Oil: Newfoundlandʼ’s Quest for Controlled Development 
(ISER: St. Johnʼ’s, 1985), particularly Chapter 5, “The Politics” for insight into the contributions 
of Peckfordʼ’s administration in the struggle with the federal government for increased offshore 
autonomy. 
69 Supra note 67 at 21.
70 Supra note 67 at 22.
71 Supra note 67 at 15.
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Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan means a plan... for providing 
manufacturers, consultants, contractors and service companies in 
the Province... with a full and fair opportunity to participate on a 
competitive basis in the supply of goods and services [emphasis 
added].72
The board reasoned that because the words “on a competitive basis” 
were added to the description of a benefits plan between the Atlantic 
Accord stage and the implementing Accord Acts, the phrase should be 
given significant interpretive weight. The board also noted what it de-
scribed as a “misconception” that either the Accord agreement or the 
resulting legislation intended some measure of preference for goods and 
services from the province: 
This misconception is often expressed as a duty on the Boardʼ’s part 
to maximize Newfoundland & Labrador/Canada content in projects. 
There was a clear consensus on this in many of the presentations 
during the public hearings. But, as has been noted, the Legislation 
is prescriptive in this area; and is prescriptive in a manner which 
precludes consideration of preference and any requirement for content 
targets. Not only is there no legislative obligation to introduce such 
a local preference policy, the wording of the Legislation prevents the 
use of requirements which would have that effect. The Legislation 
prescribes a competitive process [emphasis in original].73
This pronouncement is stunning. It is an interpretation of section 45 
of the Accord Acts that all but castrates the benefits plan provisions. 
Further, the interpretation that the legislation “precludes consideration 
of preference” is difficult to understand in light of the fact that section 
45(3)(d) requires that “first consideration” be given to goods and serv-
ices supplied from within the province when they are otherwise equiva-
lent to imported goods and services. Certainly “first consideration” must 
describe a form of preferential treatment. It is clearly arguable that a 
“competitive process” does not exclude this kind of preference: local 
goods and services compete with imports, and if they successfully com-
pete (i.e. they are as good or better then the imports) then they are to 
be given preference. It appears that the board may have misinterpreted 
section 45 by focussing too intently on the phrase “competitive process” 
and failing to read all the subsections together as a cohesive provision. 
72 The legislation is cited in C-NOPB, supra note 67 at 16.
73 Supra note 67 at 22.
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The argument by the board that it is not statutorily authorized to set 
quotas or mandate requirements for specific levels of local participation 
is also problematic. Viewed narrowly, this proposition appears, prima 
facie, to be correct: there is no wording in the statute that gives the board 
a mandate to set quotas for local content. However, one of the principal 
tasks of the petroleum boards, both the C-NOPB and the C-NSOPB, is to 
evaluate the benefits plans and either accept them or reject them. Sec-
tion 45(2) of the Newfoundland Accord Acts reads as follows:  
Before the board may approve a development plan under subsection 
135(4) or authorize any work or activity under paragraph 134(1)(b), 
a Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador benefits plan shall be 
submitted to and approved by the board, unless the board directs 
that that requirement need not be complied with.74
Clearly, the applicants cannot be approved for any development plan 
unless they have submitted and had approved a Canada-Newfoundland 
and Labrador benefits plan. It is also clear that the board is not obliged 
or compelled to accept any plan it receives. Subsection 45(3) sets out 
criteria by which a plan is to be evaluated, and includes, inter alia, the 
“first consideration” provision of section 45(3)(d): where a Newfound-
land business is equally able to provide the service or goods in question, 
that Newfoundland business should receive preference. So, while the 
board may not have a mandate to establish fixed levels of local content 
in offshore projects, it does have a mandate to approve benefits plans 
that meet the requirements of section 45 and to reject those that do not. 
To do any less is to act in dereliction of its statutory duties.
Norway and the U.K. managed to develop strong service and sup-
ply industries because they protected and promoted local industry. Yet 
the C-NOPB appears to be hesitant to even enforce the modest measures 
provided by s. 45: that local industry be given a “full and fair opportu-
nity” to compete with the giants in the global marketplace. If the White 
Rose decision is a precedent that is followed by succeeding petroleum 
boards, Newfoundlandʼ’s and Nova Scotiaʼ’s industries may not be af-
forded the opportunity to effectively compete against the giants in this 
marketplace: giants which got their early start in the shelter of those 
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3. Jurisdictional and Constitutional Issues
In one sense Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are fortunate to have as 
much control and to receive as much benefit as they do from their off-
shore petroleum industries. Legally speaking (making the safe assump-
tion that Nova Scotia is in the same position as Newfoundland), it is 
Canada that has the ultimate right to benefit from and legislate in respect 
of the offshore. On the other hand, as we have seen, the provinces were 
promised that they would benefit from the resources as if they were on 
land. The reality of the situation is that the provincesʼ’ lack of full juris-
diction over the offshore prevents them from ever fully realizing this 
promise. Because of their lack of full jurisdiction, the provinces cannot 
fully control a number of aspects of offshore development.
One such aspect is that the provinces do not have full autonomy 
to negotiate on their own behalf with large multinational corporations. 
While a hands-off approach on the part of the federal government may 
be a vestige of the fallout from the unpopular National Energy Program 
of the 1980s, some stakeholders feel that the region would benefit from 
an underlying national policy on offshore development that united the 
individual provinces on the bases of their common interests. Elizabeth 
Beale, president of the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, has writ-
ten, “[t]he lack of a defined national interest with respect to the exploita-
tion of this important industry stands in stark contrast to other key sectors 
of the Canadian economy, including aerospace and automobiles, where 
supportive policies have been instrumental in their development.”75
One must also wonder if the risk-averse multinational oil companies 
feel some trepidation in sinking significant investment capital into a re-
gion in which jurisdiction for the relevant issues is split between two 
or more levels of government as well as the petroleum boards. When 
deciding in which global region to undertake petroleum projects, ques-
tions like this must come into play. Further, the reassurance provided 
in other countries by the fact of being able to deal with a single, uni-
tary state government on all pertinent issues must have strong appeal 
by comparison. The convoluted nature of Atlantic Canadian regulatory 
regimes has also caused some legal commentators apprehension about 
75 “How Do We Create the Best Environment for Maximizing the Benefits of Offshore Oil and 
Gas Developments?” (2002) Atlantic Report Spring/Summer 5 at 7. 
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their constitutionality.76 Further, unless the provisions granting shared 
jurisdiction to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are constitutionally en-
trenched, changed circumstances could impel the federal government to 
renounce them at any time.77 
This part of the paper has provided a critical examination of some 
of the major problems facing Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in their 
efforts to realize the promise of the Accord agreements: that they be-
come the primary beneficiaries of their offshore oil and gas industries. 
As noted, the royalties generated by the industry are largely clawed 
back by Ottawa through the equalization mechanism. In light of this, in-
creased employment and industrial benefits appear to be the most prom-
ising source of increased economic integrity arising from the regionʼ’s 
petroleum industry. However, based on the example of the C-NOPB in 
the White Rose decision, it is submitted that the position taken by the 
petroleum boards has been to largely accommodate the oil companies 
rather than to challenge their commitment to maximizing local benefits. 
Improvement will have to be made in this area if the provinces are to 
realize the full economic potential of this industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The underlying authority to govern the oil and gas resources offshore 
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland is complex. As we have seen, conti-
nental shelf rights are an incidental extension of a sovereign state, in 
this case Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada in the Hibernia Refer-
ence found that it is Canada and not Newfoundland that has the right to 
exploit the resources under the continental shelf and to legislate with 
regard thereto. This almost certainly applies to Nova Scotia as well, but 
has yet to be tested. Canada and the provinces subsequently reached 
a political settlement which provided that the provinces should be the 
“principal beneficiaries” of the offshore, to the extent that they should 
benefit just as they would if the resource were onshore. 
This meaning of this commitment has come into question in recent 
years, as the benefits of provincial offshore oil and gas revenues have 
76 See for example Pettie, supra note 15.
77 Hunt, supra note 5 at 122.
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largely been negated by clawbacks in the federal equalization program. 
Questions have arisen as to what the promise of becoming principal 
beneficiaries actually meant. Were the provinces supposed to be the 
principal beneficiaries of petroleum revenue before or after the equali-
zation mechanism was engaged? Certainly, there is a strong argument 
to be made that the interaction between royalties and equalization is not 
operating as was intended nor as it should. Perhaps support from other 
provinces will lead the federal government to restructure the way these 
policies are currently operating, but there is no significant indication 
that this issue will be addressed any time soon. 
As a result, most of the provincial hopes for benefits from offshore 
development have been hung on the potential for results in increased 
employment and industrial development within the region. As we have 
seen, the current interpretation of the benefit plan requirements by the 
petroleum boards do not lead to the enforcement of any firm levels of 
local content. This is not to say that the tools to provide more support for 
local industry do not exist within the current regulatory structure. Con-
trary to the position taken by the C-NOPB in the White Rose decision, it 
is arguable that the current mandate of the boards could allow for a more 
assertive application of the “full and fair opportunity” and the “first con-
sideration” principles. Examining the policies that were adopted by the 
U.K. and Norway during the infancy of their offshore industries, we saw 
that local support and supply industries prospered with the active and 
firm assistance of state policies. There is a strong case to be made that 
local industries will not develop as successfully as those in Norway and 
the U.K. without similar support from the regulatory structures. 
It all comes down to political will and the strength of the provincesʼ’ 
negotiating positions. Norway and the U.K faced a different climate in 
terms of international trade regulation during their industriesʼ’ develop-
ments, and they also had much larger reserves to use as a bargaining 
position with the multinational oil companies. Nova Scotia and New-
foundland are hindered by more than just these two factors, however. 
The inter-jurisdictional nature of the Atlantic Canadian industry re-
quires a high level of inter-governmental cooperation to overcome these 
obstacles, and achieving such cooperation has rarely proven itself to 
be easy. Newfoundlanders in particular are liable to be sceptical in this 
regard, as they have recently seen the domestic cod fishery closed down 
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once more, while government initiatives to reduce offshore dragging by 
international vessels are minimal at best. 
The provinces face some major hurdles if they are ever to achieve 
the full benefit of the offshore oil and gas industry. It has been beyond 
the scope of this paper to offer the solutions. Instead it is hoped that 
some of the major areas offering room for improvement have been iden-
tified. 
